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BOOK REVIEW
[Or the People vs. Blackstone, Kent, Gray and Stare
Decisis (Accessories: Pontius Pilate and the Laws of the Medes and
the Persians)]. By W. Barton Leach. Lawrence: The University of
Kansas Press. 1967. Pp. xiii, 94. $2.95.

PROPERTY LAW INDICTED

The superannuated bad guys of property law, as painted by Professor
Leach, look like Jabez Stone's jury. The result - an "indictment" in his metaphor - leaves a fellow property teacher in some slight confusion. There are
not many of us who care to represent the defense. There are even fewer who
can feign affection for "unborn widows," the Rule in Shelley's Case and the
shadows of Blackstone that lurk in the county recorder's office. If a property
teacher is going to argue with this indictment at all, it will have to be by an
argument which is - as Professor Leach says the common law is - devious.
Professor Leach's indictment charges a capital offense. The author has
already built the gallows on which the bad guys of property law are to meet
justice. The hangmen are to be judges and the rope is to be a radical new
judicial device called prospective overrule. If this information does not suggest
a defense for the bad guys, it may suggest a motion to quash the indictment.
The bad guys probably should be dead, but not on Professor Leach's gallows.
Last year, I wrote "that the average American lawyer is more likely to meet
prospective overrule at a cocktail party than in a court."' It is an opinion
I can defend even after reading this latest from Lawrence, Kansas -although
I doubt that many lawyers really meet prospective overrule at cocktail parties
or in Lawrence, Kansas.
Professor Leach claims conservative credentials. He states that he is a lifelong Republican, and even that he passed the "add test" in 1936, by voting
for the candidate from Kansas.' (That test was obviously a courtesy for the
benefit of his hosts in Lawrence. Everyone knows when the acid test for Republicans was - in 1964 - but he doesn't say a word about that year.) But
Professor Leach is no conservative within his profession; he is a Karl Marx, and
the fact is so well established that it is eligible for judicial notice. If evidence
is needed, this book has plenty of it, and the tireless revolution he has waged
here and abroad toward overthrowing the rule against perpetuities is plenty
more.

3

Here is an example of prospective overrule, fashioned from several of the
cases put in this new book:' Paul Patriarch provided for his family with an
inter vivos trust that was to become irrevocable at his death. Income from this
trust was payable to his wife (widow), Millicent, for life, without power to
I
2

Shaffer, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 492, 495 (1966).
LEaCH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED 31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LEACH].
3 LEACH 69-83. Much of his work can be found in HARVARD LAW REvIEW Ass'N, ESTATE
PLANNING AND FUTURE INTERESTS (1965).
4 Lady Mountbatten's problems with the post-World War I income taxes in England are

set out in LEACH at 32-35. Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948) is used to
illustrate the problem of principal immunity in trusts in LEACH at 36-40. Disinheritance of
children is discussed in LEACH at 41-44.
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invade principal and subject to the toughest possible spendthrift clause. The
remainder was to be paid to the children of their marriage, in shares to be
computed as each reaches the age of thirty-five. Paul is dead; the widow
finds the income sufficient for living expenses, but insufficient to pay for the
education of the children and to make the advances she would like to make
to launch them in marriage and on their careers. Mrs. Patriarch's jurisdiction
does not permit the widow's right of election against her husband's will to reach
assets put in an inter vivos trust.5
Millicent Patriarch may do several things, and to keep the example in
some proportion to the indictment, assume she tries all of them. She petitions
for invasion of principal, despite the prohibition in the trust instrument. She
attempts to anticipate payments of income. Finally, she asserts her elective
rights against the trust. The precedents are, in the opinion of her lawyers,
against her on all counts. To demonstrate the sincerity of their advice, they
agree to take the case only on a per diem basis.
Professor Leach believes that absolute prohibitions on invasion of trust
principal, strict enforcement of spendthrift clauses and limitations on elective
rights to testamentary dispositions are all evil. (And if that won't prove him
a Karl Marx, what will?) Agreed, at least for purposes of this motion to quash.
He then notes, with some plausibility, that the legislature is not likely to change
these rules. 6 (At least the legislature is not going to do Millicent Patriarch any
good by changing them, but then neither is Professor Leach's solution going to
do Millicent Patriarch any good.) What he proposes is prospective overrule,
and that might mean any one of a number of things:"
(1) The court that ultimately hears Mrs. Patriarch's last appeal might
overrule one or more of the rules that are causing her discomfort, and in one
or more ways, grant her relief. The problem that arises here is that reliance
on the law in setting up schemes of property disposition, by Mr. Patriarch and
by others, is unfairly frustrated. They had a right to rely on the law as it was
when they drafted their trust instruments. This overt and sudden overruling
of precedent, so as to allow Millicent some relief, is considered too radical,'
although it is hardly unheard of in common-law courts.9
(2) The court might hold that its precedents bind Mrs. Patriarch, but
announce that henceforth, or beginning a year from now, it will no longer follow
these rules -and
such an announcement might or might not be accompanied

5

See Note, Disinheritanceof the Widow in New England, 44 B.U.L. REv. 534 (1964).

6 He notes recent amendments to the Personal and Real Property Law of New York
which, however, permit principal invasion'in circumstances such as these. LEACH 39. As a
matter of fact each of these three areas has been undergoing extensive legislative reform in
New York. See

STATE OF NEW YORK, FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES,
LEGI SLATrvE Doc. No. 19 (1965).

7

Bartlett, Prospective Overruling and Property Law, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1205, 1208-09

(1967), suggests several alternatives.
8 See LEACH 20-24, discussing Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709
(1965).
9 My favorite example, because it involves an excellent opinion by a judge who probably
did not enjoy overruling precedent is Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (Sutherland,

J).
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by a conditional threat to the legislature.1" Millicent loses, but she has the
satisfaction of knowing that she was the last of the losers.
(3) The court might adopt alternative number one above, but announce
that it will not apply its present decision to facts (the death of settlors of revocable
trusts, or perhaps the date of their trusts) arising before the date of its decision."
There are other alternatives, but these should illustrate the variety available
in Professor Leach's view of judicial vigor.
None of these alternatives has been, nor is presently, expectable judicial
behavior. Some courts have used them, most notably the Supreme Court of
the United States, and some have, to Professor Leach's dismay, declined to use
them. 2 The thrust of my motion to quash is that the remedy proposed by Professor Leach is unwise; it is inappropriate and overambitious; and it is unnecessary.
A. Unwise
It may be all right for the law to be so arranged that patriarchs cannot
prolong their mortality by dictating to their wives and children from the other
side of the safe-deposit box. This motion admits that it would be a good thing
to frustrate them- to let their ownership stop with their metabolism. But it
is unwise for an appellate court to declare that such a result has suddenly become
the common law. It is unwise because human institutions cannot survive more
than a little turbulence - especially turbulence where it is least expected.
People rely on a certain stability in their institutions, even a certain stability
in change itself, and one of the geniuses of the common law is that it has been
able to provide the stability - and to do it, by and large, without stopping the
change.' A sudden judicial declaration that (1) life tenants can invade trust
principal; (2) spendthrift clauses are not valid as against widows; and (3)
widows can elect against inter vivos trust conveyances, would involve, I think,
enough change to make the point, although this fundamental point could perhaps
be better exemplified by less esoteric illustrations.
Any system of justice that purports to find its rules in past decisions takes
a serious step when it announces that rules applied in the past were erroneous.
The function of justice in private disputes is, after all, the prevention of violence.
And violence is prevented more by the fact that citizens feel they can rely on
the rules applied by judges than by the fact that the public force will be brought
to bear on those who resort to violence. No commonwealth, least of all a republican commonwealth, can maintain a police force large enough to impose law

10 Baits v. Bats, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 '(1966) (no threat); In re Estate of
Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264
Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (threats).
11 In re Estate of Jeruzal, 269 Minn 279, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964) and Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). See Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965); Bartlett, supra note 7, at 1223-25.
12 He complains the most about Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950). Bartlett;
supra note 7, also centers his complaint on that case.
13 See Cooperrider, The Rule of Law and the Judicial Process, 59 Micn. L. Rv. 501
(1961).
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on a citizenry that has no faith in the law. Reliance on the stability of the law
m
is fundamental to the law's effectiveness as an alternative to violence
"
Abrupt change in the rules diminishes reliance because it disturbs the
familiarity of things - it disturbs, according to the philosophy of the late Professor Cahn, the psychic continuity that a man requires in order to be free
of disabling anxiety. 5 Disturbance of psychic continuity is a risk run whenever
precedent is overruled. Overrule involves even more disturbance when it purports to apply only to the future, because it is then directed to people who are
not before the court; it lacks the justification which overruling precedent has
when the court can base its judgment on the facts in the record. The ordinary
citizen - not the judges Professor Leach thinks addicted to the "Medes-andPersians syndrome" - expects judges to apply established rules. The significant
public furor over recent decisions on civil liberties is attributable in part to that
expectation, as well as to the disagreement many citizens have with the decisions
themselves.
The risk of citizen disturbance might fairly be set against even the several
technical areas Professor Leach would like to see subjected to prospective overrule: immunity of trust principal from invasion, abolition or restriction on valid
spendthrift clauses, a much narrower field within which testators can disinherit
widows and children, the elimination of a dependable power to restrict testamentary gifts to charity, the abolition of property rules on remainders and
reversions, and new canons of construction in wills. Those are far-reaching
reforms (and most, I admit, are reforms). If the highest court of any state
announced tomorrow that it proposed to implement all of them, almost as many
citizens would be directly affected as would be affected by a change in the rates
of the federal income tax. It may be that citizen disturbance on that scale is
a fair price for improvement in the law, but I doubt that Professor Leach, having
passed the acid test and certified his conservatism in 1936, is as willing to pay
it as he appears to be.
B. Inappropriateand Too Ambitious
Professor Leach's indictment is inappropriate because of something as
jingoistic as the separation of powers, and too ambitious because appellate courts
are probably the worst place in the world to develop the facts on which decisions
of this character should be based. One of the ground rules of the common law
is that cases are decided one at a time. This makes it possible for the judges
who sit in judgment on the fortune of Paul Patriarch to consider all the words
he used and all the children he fathered and all the worries facing his widow.
In cases not unlike Millicent's, this process has made it possible for judges to
give widows relief - because they did not look, and did not need to look, further
than the record in front of them. 6
14 These are thoughts which seem more compelling to me when I teach Introduction to
Law than when I teach wills, trusts, and future interests.
15 E. CAHN, TnE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 141-43 (1949).
16 Petition of Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948), is an example of this sort of
traditional behavior and supports the present thesis better than it supports Professor Leach,
who cites and relies on it at some length. Consider these excerpts from the opinion which
alternately emphasize the court's view of the testator's intention and numerous applicable New
Hampshire precedents:
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But if a court proposes to abolish in the abstract a dead man's right to
restrict his family's access to his money, it must look outside the record; it cannot refuse to do so and at the same time seriously call itself either a democratic
institution or a fair one. The magnitude of wealth devoted to similar arrangements is surely relevant. The magnitude of inconvenience visited on families
because of them is relevant. Social, economic and psychological reasons supporting the arrangements as a protection of widows and children are relevant.
Also somewhat relevant is the expectation of businessmen and custodians of
wealth, and the effect that a serious curtailment on the freedom of testation
might have upon them, their business ventures, their families and the society
in which they live.
Who is going to develop this data for the court? Perhaps Millicent Patriarch
can do it, but it is not likely that she, or her lawyers, will be interested in any facet
of the problem that is not essential to her own recovery. Amici curiae might
do it, if the court allows amici curiae and if it exercises its discretion to permit
them in the Patriarch case, and if the parties do not object. Intervenors might
do it, but no set of rules on intervention that I know of is broad enough to
admit new parties who can inform the court fully of all the implications of
upsetting a bundle of common-law rules.
Beyond that, is the court likely to heed the sort of public debate which
might well surround legislative changes of these dimensions? Is it going to hold
public hearings on the wisdom of sweeping, abstract changes? Is it going to
publish its proposed ruling, as administrative rule makers do, and then permit
objections to be filed by any interested citizen? None of this was necessary, or
at least none of it was as necessary, 7 under the moldy old common law I studied
in Casner and Leach's real property casebook. In those days a common-law
court could be bold in what it did because it knew its ruling was confined to
the facts in the record before it. And it could be bold in what it said, because
it knew that future judges would be bound to adhere to what it did rather than
to what it said. (If judges have hidden behind the words of their predecessors,
it is because they are inept judges, and prospective overrule is no more a cure
for the inept than is baptism.) 8
Traditionally, the courts of this jurisdiction have shown a signal regard for the
intent of the testator... at times at the expense of other recognized principles deemed
less cogent in their application. . . . In order to prevent impairment of a testator's
primary purpose, authority to deviate from the express terms of a gift has been granted
in cases of emergency unforeseen by him, even though contingent remainder interests
were incidentally affected ...
In this situation a court of equity need not hesitate to exercise its undoubted
power to permit a deviation from the literal provisions of the will. A means of
accomplishing the testator's purpose is thereby furnished, which it may reasonably be
inferred that he himself would have provided, had he been able to foresee the exigency. .. . This conclusion is in harmony with our own decisions and not without
support in other authorities. 56 A.2d at 643-44.
This is the use of stare decisds as a tool appropriate to judges, which prospective overrule is not.
17 Judge Learned Hand's struggles with good moral character, and the theories advocated
by Judge Jerome Frank, compel me to add this "or at least" clause. See Schmidt v. United
States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
18 As Professor Leach puts it
[I]t is very soothing and involves little effort for a modem judge to fold his hands
over his paunch, put on a starched smile, and refrain from doing any thinking on
the applicability of an "established" rule to modem conditions. LEACH 25.
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Professor Leach answers this point, and my first point, with a relevant
example:
Any major revision in policy, whether by the courts or the legislature (witness Medicare), is bound to produce disruption and inequity for some
period of readjustment.19
I am willing to witness Medicare, whith was adopted by the Congress after half
a century of lobbying both for and against it."0 It involved more hours of
legislative debate than those of us who pay for the Congressional Record care
to remember. It involved gigantic public rallies, at one of which the President
made a nationwide appeal for citizen support for the idea. It involved hundreds
of millions of dollars worth of public relations effort from one pressure group
alone. The debate reached into every doctor's office and most of the union
halls in the country.
Is the judiciary equipped to even listen to that kind of public inquiry on
major legal reforms? Is it equipped to carry out even a decorous inquiry to see
what interests will be affected by an abrupt change in the rules?2 ' Although
that sort of information is surely the minimum required by fairness in an agency
of a democratic government that proposes to fashion its rules solely on the social
and economic demands of the day, judges are not equipped to gather such
facts. But even if the judiciary was so equipped, it could not supply one of
the legislature's most reliable antidotes for disturbance of psychic continuity the wide and noisy public debate prior to changing the rules.
The court often cited by Professor Leach in his examples of prospective
overrule - the Supreme Court of the United States - is much better equipped
to do it than the courts that mold the common law in this country. There, at
least, amici do argue the public issues. It may be that the answer to concern
over poor judicial equipment for overt legislative activity is that the courts can
adopt the structure and procedures that are necessary. That might not be a
terrible state of affairs, but I am willing to bet Professor Leach a cigar that
eighty percent of the common-law judges in the United States would prefer to
stay with the Medes and the Persians, and that most of the citizenry would
approve their choice.
C. Not Necessary
Professor Leach poses his alternatives too starkly. On the one side, as he
sees it, are Pontius Pilate, the Medes and the Persians, Fox v. Snow," "unborn
widows," and the Rule in Shelley's Case. On the other is the brave new world
in which judges consider social and economic factors and announce their refusal
19 LEACH 18.
20 Harris, Medicare, THE ftw YORKER, July 2, 1966, at 29; July 9, 1966, at 30; July 16,
1966, at 35; July 23, 1966, at 35.
21 Judge Woolsey asked some friends what they thought of Ulysses, United States v. One
Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). I suppose that was decorous,
although I must note that Circuit Judge Manton, on appeal, thought the book's "characterization as obscene should be quite unanimous by all who read it," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934)
(dissenting opinion), which means that Judge Woolsey's friends were either sloppy or beyond
redemption.
22 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.21 877 (1950).
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to follow past rules while they renounce "arteriosclerotic conventionality" on
the bench.
The fact seems to me to be that the common law changes more often than
it refuses to change, although it rarely admits to change and even more rarely
needs to admit to change. We lawyers like to think and say that the common
law is the residue of Blackstone and Henry IV in our lives, but we can rarely
even with the Rule in Shelley's Case or destructibility
prove the point -not
of contingent remainders," or thanks to Professor Leach, with the rule against
perpetuities.
New York, and most of the rest of the nation, has abandoned privity of
contract in products liability cases involving negligence, without a single instance
of prospective overrule that I know of. In New Hampshire, whose highest court
Professor Leach admires, a child can now recover in tort for the negligence of a
dead parent24 - and that court did not rely on prospective overrule to reach its
result. It derived it, with one temporary detour,2 5 from the past.2" None of us
who is specially concerned with the law of property would say that change has
been as prominent as it should be, but some of us might want to attribute the
difference to something other than "the antipathy between property law and
greatness. 27
There is a middle ground between the Medes, Persians and Pilates and
the expressed "scientific appreciation of the relations of law to society and of
the needs and interests and opinions of society today."2 8 The middle ground
is sometimes devious and often capable of an ancient and esoteric sophistry,
but it produces change, it maintains stability better than overt overruling would,
and it is, for all its righteous dishonesty, useful.
Professor Leach hails MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.29 as an example of
judicial reform," ° but it seems to me that that reform began 60 years before Judge
Cardozo's MacPhersonopinion, and was conclusively settled a generation before
Mr. MacPherson's wooden wheel fell apart. The New York Court of Appeals,
in Thomas v. Winchester,"1 made "inherent danger" an exception to the rule
requiring privity of contract in negligence cases in 1852; and it did so on the
basis of cases which reach back far enough to be pedigreed. The same court
decided everything that needed to be decided to give Mr. MacPherson recovery
in the 1882 case of Devlin v. Smith,2 when the rule on "inherent danger" was
held to refer to the negligence that created the danger, as well as to the product
that was dangerous. The Devlin opinion was probably devious, but, if so, it is
23 Both rules died judicially without Professor Leach's gallows. See Crawford v. Barber,
385 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1963); Geraud, The Rule in Shelley's Case - In Memoriam? 18 Wyo.
L.J. 17 (1963).
24 Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
25 Worrall v. Moran, 101 N.H. 13, 131 A.2d 438 (1957).
26 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A.2d 905 (1930), a magnificent example of
change within stare decisis.
27 LEACH 12.
28 LEACH 30, quoting Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jrrisprudence, 19 THE GREEN
BAG 607, 610-11 (1907).
29 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
30 LEACH 11, 89.
31 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
32 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
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nonetheless possible to admire the judicial skill which went into hiding its deviousness. A New York lawyer who let his clients rely on privity of contract after
Thomas v. Winchester was not as careful as he should have been, and one who
gave the same advice after the Devlin decision was simply not reading the
advance sheets. Cardozo's MacPherson opinion was more a eulogy than a
manifesto.
Thus, there is an alternative, within the traditional method of the common
law, to the Pontius Pilate syndrome; an alternative which Professor Leach knows
as much about as anyone in the world, but an alternative not espoused in his
brief for prospective overrule: Courts can, should, and do change judge-made
law without resorting to such a drastic tactic. The ordinary means that common-law courts use to change judge-made law is a process of gradual change
35
within stare deciis.
It can be a dynamic process because it turns on the
formulation of rules from the facts and decisions of past cases, a process that
is carried out by modern men, with their perception, their intuition and their
rhetoric. If a modern judge is trapped in the rhetoric of the past, it is a trap
he makes for himself. It is a trap from which stare decisis itself can deliver
him so that the abrupt overruling of precedent is rarely necessary. The judicial
device of prospective overrule is no part of this tradition; it is a radical innovation that should be seen for what it is.
Thomas L. Shaffer*

33 This is best seen in practice and best learned, I think, in attempts at imitation. It has,
however, been described analytically. E. Lnvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGOAL REASONING
(1948); Cooperrider, supra note 13.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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LAW GOVERNING ACQUISITION OF SCHOOL PROPERTY.

STANDARDS: MIRANDA V. ARIZONA. By Nathan R.
Sobel, Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, New York. The
author traces the exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions from
Brown v. Mississippi to Miranda v. Arizona. Jamaica: Gould Publications. 1966. Pp. iii, 153. $6.50.

THE NEW CONFESSION

OVERCHARGE.

By Lee Metcalf, United States Senator from Montana. An

expose of the methods used by investor owned electric companies to
exploit the public through exorbitant rates. New York: David McKay
Co. 1967. Pp. ix, 338. $5.95.
PATTERN AUTOMOBILE INTERROGATORIES.

By Douglas Danner. An exhaustive

well-indexed list of questions for both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel.
Rochester: Aqueduct Books. 1966. Pp. xx, 664. $25.00.
By
Arlen Specter and Marvin Katz. A concise pocket reference for police
officers. Philadelphia: Chilton Books. 1967. Pp. 64. $.95 (paperback).

POLICE GUIDE TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE, INTERROGATION, AND CONFESSION.

POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES. By William L. Cary, Professor of
Law, Columbia University. The author discusses the reasons for and
the effects of conflicting pressures upon the federal independent regulatory
agencies from both the Executive and the Congress, and the everincreasing problem of sterilization of agency dynamism resulting from
the nature of bureaucratic administration. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co. 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95.
THE PURE THEORY OF LAW. By Hans Kelsen, former Dean of the Law Faculty,
University of Vienna. The author believes that a "pure" positive law
exists unaffected by either the moral or the social order. The rationale
of law is not found in either God or nature, but in a certain juristic
hypothesis which he calls "basic norm," which is established by a logical
analysis of actual juristic thinking. Berkeley: University of California
Press. 1967. Pp. x, 356. $7.50.
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THE SILENT SYNDICATE. By Hank Messick. A study of organized crime in the

United States with primary emphasis on the Cleveland syndicate. New
York: The Macmillan Co. 1967. Pp. xii, 303. $6.95.
LAW. By J. C. Hall, Fellow of St. John's College and
Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge. Cases and materials on
Family Law in the Commonwealth. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1966. Pp. xxi, 507. $11.50.

SOURCES OF FAMILY

Edited by Wallace Mendelson,
Professor of Government, University of Texas. The author analyzes the

THE SUPREME COURT: LAW AND DISCRETION.

Black -

Douglas v. Frankfurter -

Harlan controversy and shows its

impact upon American history. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1967. Pp.
xvii, 509. $4.25 (paperback).
A QUESTION OF MANDATE. By R. Alton Lee,
Associate Professor of History, University of South Dakota. The story
of the violent genesis and early history of this famous labor legislation.
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1966. Pp. viii, 254. $7.50.

TRUMAN AND TAFT-HARTLEY:

VIETNAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

By The Lawyers' Committee on American

Policy Towards Vietnam. A condemnation of American military policy

in Southeast Asia. Flanders: O'Hare Books. 1967. Pp. 162. $2.00
(paperback).

By L. Brent Bozell. This best seller charges that
the United States Supreme Court under Earl Warren has been handing
down decisions in clear violation of the traditional view of the Court's
proper role. New Rochelle: Arlington House. 1966. Pp. 366. $7.00.

THE WARREN REvoLUTIoN.

MUNiCIPAL PRAcTIcEs AND POLICIES. By Richard F.
Babcock, Commissioner of the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission.

THE ZONING GAME:

A presentation of' the ills which infect current-day zoning procedures
and suggestions for curing them. Madison: University of Wisconsin

Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 202. $5.75.
The listing of a book in this section does not preclude its being reviewed in a
subsequent issue of the LAWYER.

In the June Issue
A Survey

LEGAL PROBLEMS
of the

BANKING
INDUSTRY
This thorough and comprehensive treatment of many legal
problems contains topics suggested by officers of leading banks.
Some of the topics explored:
I. Legal Problems Relating to the Dual System of State and
National Banks
II. Legal Relations Among the Important Federal Banking
Agencies
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Federal Reserve Board
The Comptroller of the Currency
III. Antitrust Problems Currently Faced by Banks
If your practice extends to any aspect of the banking industry, this issue of the LAWYER is essential to your library!
Single Copies $2.00
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